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NOTE 
UNITED STATES v. HOWARD: 
REFOCUSING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR 
PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a probationer is released from a correctional facility. I 
Pursuant to his release he must adhere to specific conditions to ensure 
that he does not engage in further criminal activity, including the 
warrantless search of his residence at any time. 2 These conditions have 
been imposed because the probationer's criminal history indicates that he 
poses an egregious threat to society. This probationer appears to be in 
compliance with the conditions of his release; however, in secret, he is 
engaged in the exact type of criminal activity the conditions of his 
supervised release are designed to prevent. 
Suppose the probation officer assigned to this probationer receives 
reports from an informant indicating the probationer is regressing into 
criminal activity at an unreported address. An investigation of these 
reports ultimately results in the discovery of evidence suggesting the 
probationer has established a "safe house,,3 where he can engage in 
I This hypothetical was created by the author to illustrate the issues addressed in this Note. 
The terms probationer, parolee, and supervised releasee will be used interchangeably throughout this 
Note since the Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is not a "constitutional difference between 
probation and parole for the purposes of the fourth amendinent." United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 
894, 896 n.l (1991). 
2 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.s. 112,119 (2001). 
3 A "safe house" is a place where a probationer could deposit the fruit of his or her illegal 
activities, and where it would not be discovered pursuant to conditions of a supervised release. See 
United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
515 
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criminal activity without detection. Further proactive investigation has 
been thwarted, however, due to the lack of sufficient evidence to satisfy 
the ambiguous, yet stringent, probable cause standard to establish the 
safe house as the probationer's residence, and thus subject it to a 
warrantless search. A search of the safe house would, therefore, be 
unconstitutional. 4 As a result, the probation officer is helpless to fulfill 
his duty to ensure that the probationer is refraining from criminal activity 
and, further, protect society's interest in preventing crime. 
In United States v. Howard, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that officers had probable 
cause to believe Curtis Ray Howard, a probationer, resided at an 
unreported address.5 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the search of the 
address violated Howard's Fourth Amendment rights.6 In overturning 
the district court's decision, the majority developed a stringent probable 
cause standard, thus crippling a probation officer's ability to search a 
suspected safe house. 7 The court stated that officers do not have 
probable cause to believe a probationer lives at an unreported residence 
when (1) visits to the probationer's reported address suggest that the 
probationer continued to reside there; (2) the police watched the address 
in question for a month and did not see the probationer there; (3) no 
credible witnesses had seen the probationer at the address in question for 
some time before the search; (4) the probationer did not have a key to the 
residence in question; and (5) neither the probationer nor his or her 
purported co-resident admitted to his or her residence there. 8 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit rigidly followed circuit 
precedent to create and apply an incorrect standard to determine whether 
probable cause existed to believe that Howard resided at an unreported 
address. The court should have determined the reasonableness of the 
search by balancing Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as a 
probationer with legitimate governmental interests.9 Furthermore, the 
court's analysis served to protect the property at the unreported address 
4 See id. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
5 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006). 
6 [d. (reversing the district court's ruling that police had probable cause to believe Howard 
resided at an unreported address); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating "[tlhe right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.") 
7 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268. 
Sid. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Samson v. California, 
126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006). 
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rather than Howard's Fourth Amendment privacy rights. lO This decision 
is contrary to the principle articulated in Katz v. United States, which 
states the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect people, not places. II 
Part I of this Note provides a background of the facts and procedural 
history of Howard, followed by a discussion of the development of the 
probable cause standard in the Ninth Circuit. 12 Part II examines the 
court's analysis and application of the probable cause standard to the 
facts in Howard, followed by a discussion of Circuit Judge John T. 
Noonan's concurring opinion, which cast doubt on the constitutionality 
of the majority's decision. 13 Part III argues that the court should have 
balanced Howard's reduced expectation of privacy against legitimate 
governmental interests to determine whether the search of the unreported 
address was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Part 
IV analyzes whether Howard had standing to assert his Fourth 
Amendment rightS. 15 Finally, Part V concludes that the court failed to 
use the correct standard to determine whether the search of the residence 
in question was reasonable. 16 
I. BACKGROUND 
In Howard, the Ninth Circuit engaged in an extensive factual 
recitation prior to determining whether officers had probable cause to 
believe Howard resided at an unreported address. 17 The court focused on 
Howard's conduct, his interaction with his probation officer, and 
information the officers had received indicating that Howard was 
violating the conditions of his supervised release. 18 The court then 
turned its analysis to the nature of the probable cause test. 19 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 28, 1996, Chief Judge Phillip M. Pro of the United 
States District Court for the District of Nevada sentenced Curtis Ray 
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
II Id. 
12 See infra notes 17-74 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 75-129 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 130-182 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 183-198 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text. 
17 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1258-62 (9th Cir. 2006). 
18 See id. at 1266-67. 
19 See id. at 1262. 
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Howard ("Howard") to ninety-six months of incarceration and three 
years of supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of bank 
robbery.2o On April 14, 2003, Howard was placed on supervised release 
under the supervision of Probation Officer Robert Aquino ("Aquino,,).21 
Howard's release was subject to several conditions, including a 
"warrantless search of his residence, person, property, and automobile at 
any time.'.22 Furthermore, Howard was precluded from associating with 
convicted felons. 23 Howard reported his residence as 4879 East Owens, 
Las Vegas, Nevada ("East Owens,,).24 
Shortly after his release, Howard met Tami Barner ("Barner,,).25 On 
May 14, 2003, Barner met with Aquino to request permission to continue 
her relationship with Howard. 26 Barner was denied permission to 
associate with Howard because the relationship violated a condition of 
his release, since Barner was a seven-time convicted felon and a 
recovering cocaine addict. 27 Howard agreed to discontinue the 
relationship to abide by the conditions of his supervised release.28 
On February 3, 2004, a confidential informant who claimed to know 
Howard contacted Aquino.29 The informant told Aquino that Howard 
was living at 2221 West Bonanza ("West Bonanza"), had a firearm at the 
apartment, and spent time at a local tavern known for gang activity.3o 
However, the informant could not specify which apartment Howard was 
living in within the West Bonanza complex.31 Barner had previously 
told Aquino that she resided in apartment forty-nine at 2221 West 
Bonanza.32 
To investigate, Aquino drove to the West Bonanza apartment and 
20 ld. at 1258. See Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Howard, No. 05-10469 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 13,2005); Appellee's Answering Brief at 2, United States v. Howard, No. 05-10469 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 23, 2005). 
21 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1258. 
22 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the purpose of this condition was to 
ensure Howard was abiding by further conditions of his supervised release); see also infra notes 
143-151 and accompanying text (discussing this distinction). 
23 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006). 
24 ld. 
25 ld. 
26 1d. 
27 1d. (noting Aquino informed both Barner and Howard that their relationship must be 
terminated). 
2JJ ld. 
29 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006). 
30 ld. 
31 Id. The confidential informant also stated that he or she had not seen Howard for two 
weeks and denied having a motive to fabricate information. ld. 
32 1d. 
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then to the East Owens address. 33 Aquino did not observe Howard at 
either address, nor did he see him the following day at the tavern 
suggested by the informant. 34 Aquino later returned to the West Bonanza 
complex and contacted the apartment manager who, after seeing a 
picture of Howard, stated that he had seen Howard at the complex and 
that Howard's car had been parked in the parking 10t. 35 This information 
was corroborated by the president of the condominium owners 
association, who stated that he had seen Howard visiting Barner at the 
complex. 36 
Aquino's visit to the West Bonanza complex heightened his concern 
that Howard was violating the conditions of his release by residing at the 
West Bonanza apartment and engaging in criminal activity.37 Further, 
Aquino grew increasingly concerned because he attempted to visit 
Howard at the East Owens address ten times, yet found him there only 
twice. 38 Moreover, Aquino had made morning visits to the East Owens 
address because, based on his knowledge of Howard's work schedule, 
this was the time Howard was most likely to be home.39 However, 
Howard was present on Aquino's most recent visit to the East Owens 
address.40 This address appeared to be Howard's residence because there 
were pictures, clothes, and furniture in the house.41 
Aquino contacted the local police department to determine whether 
Howard was the subject of any investigations.42 A member of the Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Gang Unit told Aquino there were no ongoing 
investigations concerning Howard.43 However, a gang-unit officer later 
informed Aquino that a teliable informant stated that Howard was a gun 
dealer and possibly a leader of the West Coast Bloods.44 
On February 7, Aquino received a second call from the original 
33 Jd. 
34 Jd. 
35 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006). 
36 Jd. 
37 Jd. 
38 Jd. at 1259-60. 
39 Jd. at 1260. Aquino knew, however, that Howard's work schedule was subject to change 
and that Howard was not required to report such changes. Jd. Prior to the tip from the informant, 
Aquino had not been concerned that Howard was not residing at the East Owens address. Jd. 
40 Jd. 
41 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, on another 
occasion when Howard was not at the East Owens address, Aquino had spoken with one of 
Howard's neighbors, who suggested that Howard still resided there. Jd. 
42 Jd. 
43 Jd. 
44 Jd. 
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informant, who stated that Howard's vehicle was currently at the West 
Bonanza apartment.45 Aquino immediately drove to the West Bonanza 
apartment complex, where he observed Howard's vehicle parked directly 
below Barner's apartment.46 Aquino enlisted the help of other officers to 
conduct surveillance on both the East Owens residence and the West 
Bonanza apartment beginning February 10.47 As of March 8, when the 
surveillance ended, officers had not affIrmatively seen Howard at the 
West Bonanza apartment. 48 On March 17, Aquino returned to the leasing 
offIce and a leasing agent told him that Howard had been seen at the 
West Bonanza apartment roughly a week and a half before.49 
Aquino secured an order from the probation department to search 
both the West Bonanza apartment and the East Owens residence. 50 On 
March 30, at 6:00 a.m., Aquino arrived at the East Owens apartment to 
search Howard's residence, but he did not see Howard's car parked in 
the parking 10t.51 At approximately 6:30 a.m., Aquino drove to the West 
Bonanza apartment, where he observed Howard's car parked below 
Barner's apartment.52 While waiting for the search team to arrive, 
Aquino observed Howard emerge from the apartment without a shirt on 
and stand in the doorway for ten to fifteen minutes. 53 
Barner and Howard subsequently left the West Bonanza apartment 
and began walking in different directions.54 After they separated, 
Aquino and another member of the search team confronted Barner. 55 
Barner was notified that officers were going to conduct a search of her 
apartment based upon Howard's presence there. 56 Barner stated that 
Howard did not reside at the apartment, that he, did not have a key, and 
that she refused consent to the search. 57 
Meanwhile, Howard had been handcuffed for officer safety and read 
his Miranda rights.58 Howard admitted that he stayed at the West 
45 1d. 
46 ld. 
47 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1260 (9th Cir. 2006). 
48 ld. 
49 1d. 
50 1d. 
5! Id. 
52 1d. at 1261. 
53 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006). 
54 ld. 
55 1d. 
56 ld. 
57/d. Barner acknowledged, however, that Howard had personal belongings in her 
apartment. /d. 
58 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006); see generally Miranda v. 
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Bonanza apartment, but denied living there and stated that he did not 
have a key to the apartment. 59 Barner was given permission to leave the 
scene, and she again refused to consent to a search of her apartment. 60 
The officers attempted to gain entry to the West Bonanza apartment by 
using Howard's keys in the lock, but they were unsuccessfu1.61 
The apartment owner approached the officers and let them into 
Barner's apartment.62 Aquino was approached by another resident of the 
complex who stated that she had seen Howard at the West Bonanza 
apartment at least eighty to ninety percent of the time.63 The officers' 
search revealed a gun wrapped in a hat, concealed in a closet. 64 Howard 
admitted that the gun was his.65 However, Howard's only other 
possessions at the apartment were an alarm clock and a prescription with 
Howard's name on it.66 
At his indictment, Howard challenged the constitutionality of the 
search and sought to suppress his statements as fruit of the poisonous 
tree.67 Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate entered a finding 
that the search was constitutional and that the incriminating statements 
were voluntary. 68 The district court adopted these findings, and Howard 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to charges that he knowingly received 
a firearm. 69 
Arizona, 384 U.s. 436, 467 (1966) (holding that "[i]n order to combat these pressures [of custodial 
interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights 
must be fully honored."); see also id. at 478-79 (requiring that when an individual is taken into 
custody, he or she must be apprised of the right to remain silent, that anything said will be used in 
court, that he or she has a right to an attorney, and that if the individual cannot afford an attorney one 
will be provided). 
59 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006). 
60 Id. 
61 1d. 
62 1d. But see id. n.3 (stating that the government conceded that the apartment owner did not 
have the power to consent to a search of the apartment). 
63 1d. at 1261. 
64 ld. 
65 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006). 
66 ld. 
67 1d. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963) (holding that 
evidence obtained by officers during an unlawful search must be excluded as fruits of such illegality; 
furthermore, "[t]he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of 
such invasions."). 
68 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1261. 
69 1d. at 1261-62. Howard reserved the right to appeal the validity of the probation search 
and was sentenced to 120 months, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Id. 
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B. AN INTRA-CIRCUIT SPLIT RESOLVED 
In the Ninth Circuit, prior to Motley v. Parks, decided in 2005, there 
was an intra-circuit split regarding the correct standard to use in 
determining whether a parolee resides at an unreported address. 7o The 
court in United States v. Dally held that a parolee may be searched 
pursuant to a consent provision in his parole terms, if his parole officer 
reasonably believed that a search was appropriate.71 Furthermore, the 
Dally court required police to have a "reasonable belief' that a parolee 
resides at a particular place before conducting a parole search.72 In 
contrast, the court in United States v. Harper held that officers must have 
probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of an address before 
conducting a warrantless search.73 Motley v. Parks resolved this intra-
circuit split by holding that "before conducting a warrantless search 
pursuant to a parolee's parole condition, law enforcement officers must 
have probable cause to believe that the parolee is a resident of the house 
to be searched.,,74 
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Howard, Circuit Judge Jay S. Bybee, writing for the court, 
implicitly recognized that the court in Harper stated that there was no 
constitutional difference between probation and parole for the purposes 
of determining the validity of a warrantless search.75 The Howard court 
then examined a series of prior decisions, in which the Ninth Circuit had 
found probable cause, to articulate what factors must be considered in 
determining whether the stringent probable cause standard for finding a 
70 See Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005). 
71 United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861,863 (9th Cir. 1979). 
72 Id; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968) (stating that to justify a search based on 
reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."). The terms 
"belief' and "suspicion" are used interchangeably throughout the cases discussed in this Note. 
73 United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,896 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213,245 n.l3 (1983) (stating that "[iJn making a determination of probable cause the relevant 
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts."). Probable cause is a more stringent standard than 
reasonable suspicion because probable cause focuses on the degree of suspicion associated with a 
particular act as opposed to the particularized facts taken with inferences involved in reasonable 
suspicion. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968), with Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 
n.l3 (1983). 
74 Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 
7S See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (referring to the 
applicable standard to determine whether a parolee or a probationer resides at a particular residence); 
see also United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.l (9th Cir. 1991). 
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parolee resides at a particular place is satisfied.76 The court concluded 
the relevant factors to be the following: (1) whether the parolee appeared 
to be residing at any address other than the one searched; 77 (2) whether 
officers had directly observed something that gave them good reason to 
suspect that the parolee was using the unreported residence as a home 
base; 78 (3) whether the parolee had a key to the residence in question; 79 
and (4) whether the parolee's co-resident, or the parolee himself, 
identified the residence in question as that of the parolee. 8o In analyzing 
these factors, the court stated that when presented with weak facts, it 
would not hesitate to rule that officers could not justify a search for lack 
of probable cause.Sl Confusingly, the court's analysis gave some of the 
factors more weight than others, yet no factor alone was intended to be 
76 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262-66. 
77 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 842-
43 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating an officer had been to a probationer's reported address twenty-one times 
and found him there only once). In Conway, the probationer's only possession at his reported 
address was a pair of socks. Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43. See also United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 
790, 792 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing an informant stated that the probationer was living at an 
unreported address, driving a Ford Taurus, and selling cocaine; further. the probationer was followed 
to the unreported address); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting police 
believed a parolee was violating the conditions of his parole by manufacturing drugs; however, the 
agents did not have his current address); United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(noting a parole agent was unsuccessful in locating a parolee at his unreported address). 
78 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43 (recognizing a 
probation officer confirmed an informant's tip that a probationer walked his dog around the 
unreported address, was known by his "street moniker" in the neighborhood, and was seen leaving 
the unreported address early in the morning). In Conway, the probationer told the probation officer 
that he had a dog at the unreported address; furthermore, while at the unreported address, the 
probation officer noticed mail and notes addressed to the probationer. Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43. 
See also Watts, 67 F.3d at 792-93 (stating officers confirmed the probationer was driving a Taurus 
that had been seen parked in the driveway of the unreported address and noting the probationer was 
observed walking to the front door of his reported address, knocking, waiting for an answer, and 
then leaving when no one responded); Harper, 928 F.2d at 895 (noting that acting on a tip, police 
began surveillance on the parolee's brothers' house where he was seen entering and exiting the 
residence); Daily, 606 F.2d at 862 (recognizing agents notified the parole agent the parolee was 
residing at a different address and was seen driving a car parked at the address overnight). 
79 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 843 (noting that the 
probationer opened the door of the unreported address with his own key to allow the officer access 
to the residence); Watts, 67 F.3d at 793 (conftmling a search of the probationer's vehicle resulted in 
the discovery of keys and a garage door opener that were later confrrmed to be for the unreported 
address); Harper, 928 F.2d at 895 (noting the parolee was seen entering the unreported address with 
his own key); Daily, 606 F.2d at 863 (stating the parolee was observed entering and exiting the 
residence by the use of his own key while carrying dry cleaning). 
80 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 843 (recognizing that the 
probationer identified the bedroom at the unreported address as his); Watts, 67 F.3d at 793 (noting 
the probationer's girlfriend informed the police that they lived together at the house in question). 
81 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1265 (9th Cir. 2006). But see id. at 1266 
n.13 (stating that the final factor, a denial by the parolee or his co-resident that the parolee lives at 
the unreported address, is not necessarily credible because it can be tinged with self-interest). 
9
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dispositive. 82 
A. APPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD 
The Howard court first articulated the factors that would establish 
probable cause to believe a probationer resides at an unreported address, 
then applied the factors to the facts of the case.83 The court compared the 
facts in United States v. Dally, United States v. Harper, United States v. 
Conway, and United States v. Watts to the facts in Howard and 
concluded that none of the factors were met. 84 Therefore, officers lacked 
probable cause to believe that Howard resided at the West Bonanza 
apartment. 85 The court held that the search of the West Bonanza 
apartment violated Howard's Fourth Amendment rights.86 Consequently, 
the court excluded the gun discovered at the apartment and Howard's 
confession as fruit of the poisonous tree.8? 
First, the court analyzed whether Howard appeared to be residing at 
the East Owens address.88 Aquino testified that he had visited Howard at 
the East Owens address ten times yet found him there only twice. 89 
However, Aquino opined that this was not a low success rate in light of 
Howard's work schedule.90 Aquino testified that he had spoken to 
Howard's neighbors while attempting to visit him at the East Owens 
address.91 One neighbor told Aquino that he had just missed Howard, 
82 See. e.g .• Howard, 447 F.3d at 1267 (focusing on the fact that Aquino did not suspect that 
Howard was not living at the East Owens address until the tip from the confidential informant, and 
that Howard did not have a key to the West Bonanza apartment). The court focused on the 
information officers did not have, as opposed to the information they had obtained, such as the 
information given by the confidential informant, statements by neighbors, and observations on the 
morning of the search. See id. 
83 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266-68. 
84 Id. at 1265-67. 
85 1d. at 1268. 
86 1d. 
87 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006). 
88 See id. at 1266-68. 
89/d. at 1266. The court noted that in Conway, officers attempted to visit Conway at his 
reported address twenty times and found him there only once, thus Aquino's success rate of 20% is 
much higher than the 5% success rate in Conway. Id. at 1265, 1266. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (stating that "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of 
legal rules.") Instead, the court's analysis in Howard created an arbitrary legal rule rather than a 
fluid probability by implying that a certain percentage of successful officer visits, somewhere 
between 5% and 20%, are required to establish probable cause to believe that a parolee is residing at 
the address. See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66. 
90 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266. 
91 Id. at 1267. 
10
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and another stated that Howard was still living at the East Owens 
address. 92 There was also no indication that Howard did not respond to 
messages left at the East Owens address.93 Moreover, the court found 
that more evidence existed to show that Howard resided at the East 
Owens address rather than at the West Bonanza apartment. 94 The court 
concluded that simply observing Howard at the West Bonanza 
apartment, while he visited Barner, was insufficient to create probable 
cause to believe he lived there.95 
On March 30, the day of the search, the apartment manager, who 
had seen Howard in the complex in early February, told the officers that 
he had not seen Howard for about a week. 96 The best evidence police 
had indicating that Howard lived at the West Bonanza apartment was a 
statement by one of Barner's neighbors, who stated that she had seen 
Howard there at least eighty to ninety percent of the time. 97 This 
statement, however, was inconsistent with what officers observed during 
surveillance and contradicted prior statements made by the apartment 
complex staff members. 98 The court reasoned that the ftrst factor to 
establish probable cause was not satisfted because Howard appeared to 
be residing at the East Owens address and not the West Bonanza 
apartment. 99 
Turning to the second factor, the court examined whether officers 
directly observed something that gave them good reason to suspect that 
Howard was using the unreported West Bonanza apartment as a home 
base. IOO The court focused on the fact that police had watched the West 
Bonanza residence for nearly an entire month and there were no reports 
of Howard entering the apartment complex during that period. 101 Prior to 
March 30, the day of the search, officers had not seen Howard or his car 
at the West Bonanza complex since February 7.((12 The court concluded 
that the officers had not directly observed anything that gave them good 
92 ld. 
93 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006). 
94 ld. 
95 ld. 
96 ld. 
97 ld. 
98 ld. 
99 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100 ld. at 1266-67. 
101 ld. at 1267. 
102 ld. The court also noted that February 7 was the last day the officers had been in contact 
with the confidential informant who had originally stated Howard lived with Barner at the West 
Bonanza apartment. ld. 
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reason to suspect that Howard lived at the West Bonanza apartment. 103 
Third, the court focused on whether Howard had a key to the West 
Bonanza apartment. 104 The police knew Howard did not have a key to 
the West Bonanza apartment because they checked each of his keys 
against the door on the morning of the search. 105 Jacobs, the West 
Bonanza complex manager, unlocked the apartment door so the officers 
could conduct their search.I06 The court stated this factor was in stark 
contrast to Dally, Harper, Watts, and Conway because the parolee had a 
key to the unreported address in each of those cases. 107 
Fourth, the court examined whether Barner or Howard identified the 
West Bonanza address as Howard's residence. 108 In contrast to Conway, 
neither Howard nor Barner told the officers that Howard lived at the 
West Bonanza apartment. 109 Howard and Barner both admitted that 
Howard had a few personal belongings in the apartment, yet they also 
stated he was not a resident. 110 The court acknowledged that such 
statements are tinged with self-interest and that Barner clearly had a 
motive to lie because she knew that Howard was violating his parole by 
associating with her. III 
The court concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to 
believe Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment,112 overruling the 
district court on that point. 113 Therefore, both the gun found at the 
103 /d. at 1268. 
104 Id. at 1266. 
105 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006). 
106 /d. 
107 1d.; see United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the 
probationer opened the door of the umeported address with his own key to allow the officer access 
to the residence); United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790,793 (9th Cir. 1995) (focusing on a search of 
the probationer's vehicle resulted in the discovery of keys and a garage door opener that were later 
confirmed to be for the umeported address); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 
1991) (noting the parolee was see entering the umeported address with his own key); United States 
v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating the parolee was observed entering and exiting 
the residence by the use of his own key while carrying dry cleaning). 
lOS Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266. 
109 1d. at 1267. Compare United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that Conway said his dog was at the umeported residence and identified a room at the residence as 
his). 
110 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1267. 
III United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1266 n.13 (9th Cir. 2006). The court stated 
further that Barner's relationship with Howard presumably violated her parole, so she had reason to 
downplay the extent of her contact with Howard to keep herself out of custody. /d. 
112 1d. at 1268. Although the Howard court stated that there were five factors to determine 
whether probable cause existed to believe a parolee is residing at an unreported address, the court 
did not expressly analyze the credibility of the witnesses involved in the case. Id. at 1266-68. 
113 1d. at 1268. 
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apartment and Howard's confession were excluded as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. 114 
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION, DUBITANTE: A CLOSER LOOK Is 
REQUIRED 
Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., filed a concurring oplmon, 
dubitante,115 stating that in adherence to the Motley decision, officers 
must have probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of the 
house to be searched before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to 
a parolee's parole condition. 116 However, Judge Noonan stated that 
although he "[could not] deny the controlling standard set by Motley and 
the pattern of what constitutes probable cause [was] not unreasonably 
presented" by the majority, he doubted whether circuit precedent 
conformed to the Constitution as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Knights. ll7 
Judge Noonan explained that in Knights, the Supreme Court held 
that the distinction between probationary searches and investigative 
searches was without foundation. 118 In Knights, the Court analyzed the 
reasonableness of the search of the probationer's residences by balancing 
the degree a search intruded on a probationer's privacy with the degree a 
search was necessary to promote a legitimate governmental interest. 119 
Judge Noonan drew attention to the fact that the Knights Court noted a 
"probationer was a person undergoing punishment. ... [and does] not 
enjoy 'some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.'"120 With regard 
to the government's interests, the Court found "it is 'the very assumption 
of the institution of probation' that a probationer is more likely than an 
ordinary citizen to violate the law.,,121 Further, Judge Noonan noted one 
prevalent governmental interest was the realization of the strong 
114 Id. 
115 The word "dubitante" is used "next to a judge's name, indicating that the judge doubted a 
legal point but was unwilling to state that it was wrong." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th ed. 
2004). 
116 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
117 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 
(2001). 
118 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001». 
119 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001». 
120 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112. 119 (200 I» (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001». 
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"incentive that a probationer has to go to greater lengths to conceal his 
new criminal activity, which, if detected, will send him back to prison in 
a summary proceeding." 122 
In applying the balancing test from Knights, Judge Noonan stated 
that the majority's analysis did not account for Howard's diminished 
expectation of privacy, or for the government's interest in preventing his 
possession of a fIrearm. 123 Furthermore, Judge Noonan opined that, in 
effect, the majority created a safe house where Howard could stash a gun 
and engage in further criminal activity.124 Such a consequence was a 
result of the majority's rigid application of precedent without taking the 
Knights perspective of reasonableness into account when analyzing 
probable cause.125 Finally, Judge Noonan recognized that the Supreme 
Court in Katz held that the Fourth Amendment protects people not 
places, a decision that enlarged the scope of protection. 126 However, 
application of the same concept here contracted the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment. 127 The majority's decision protected the property of 
the West Bonanza apartment. 128 According to Judge Noonan, the Fourth 
Amendment was not designed to offer this type of sanctuary to felons 
serving part of their sentence on parole. 129 
m. REASONABLENESS: THE TRUE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prescribes 
that, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... 
. ,,130 The Knights Court held reasonableness to be the "touchstone" of a 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 131 A balancing test is required to assess 
122 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan. 1.. concurring). 
123 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
124 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
125 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
126 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affumation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). 
127 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring). 
128 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
129 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
130 U.S. CONST. amend IV. Probable cause must be "supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." [d. 
131 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
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such reasonableness, in which the degree of intrusion into an individual's 
privacy is weighed against legitimate governmental interests. 132 
Reasonableness is established if, at the time of the search, officers are 
aware of facts "sufficient to support a belief, in 'a man of reasonable 
caution,'" that criminal activity is afoot. 133 
In Howard, the Ninth Circuit used the incorrect standard to 
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that Howard was 
violating a condition of his supervised release. l34 The court should have 
determined the reasonableness of the search by balancing Howard's 
reduced expectation of privacy with legitimate governmental interests. 135 
Furthermore, the court's opinion is flawed because it recognized a 
distinction between probationary searches pursuant to a condition of a 
supervised release and investigative searches directed at uncovering 
evidence of criminal activity, yet this distinction is without foundation. 136 
The Howard court applied a stringent standard, considering four 
factors, to determine whether probable cause existed to believe that 
Howard was violating a condition of his supervised release by residing at 
the West Bonanza apartment. 137 However, the court failed to determine 
whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment was reasonable 
because the court did not apply the test, articulated in Knights and 
affirmed in Samson v. California, which balances a parolee's reduced 
expectation of privacy with legitimate governmental interests. 138 The 
majority relied on the Motley decision, which held that before conducting 
a warrantless search pursuant to a parolee's parole condition, officers 
must have probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of the 
132 See id. at 118-19 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also 
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2197 (2006). 
133 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). 
134 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
135 See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring). Knights and Samson require application of the 
balancing test to determine the existence of probable cause. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19; Samson, 
126 S. Ct. at 2197; see also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268. 
136 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 143-151 and 
accompanying text. 
137 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-67. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) 
(stating "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.") The test created 
by the majority, focusing on a series of factors to detennine whether officers have probable cause to 
believe a probationer is residing at a particular place, creates a "neat set of legal rules" that, in effect, 
would not be applicable to all situations and could not be applied in a uniform fashion. See Howard, 
447 F.3d at 1268. 
138 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006). 
15
Kersten: Probable Cause for Probationers/Parolees
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
530 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
house to be searched. 139 The Motley court recognized that requlflng 
officers to have probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at a 
particular address prior to conducting a search protects the interests of 
third parties. l40 However, if a third party or the parolee does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a place, he or she does not have 
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. 141 This creates a 
contradiction because Howard, if not a resident at the West Bonanza 
apartment, could not claim that Aquino's search violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 142 
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBATION AND INVESTIGATIVE 
SEARCHES Is WITHOUT FOUNDATION 
There is no constitutional requirement that a search condition in a 
probation order must be seen as limited to probation searches, thereby 
excluding investigative searches. 143 In Knights, the Supreme Court held 
that the distinction between probationary searches, pursuant to conditions 
of release, and investigative searches, directed at uncovering evidence of 
criminal activity by a felon on probation, lacks foundation. 144 
Furthermore, the Court in Knights stated that searches have been upheld 
pursuant to probation conditions, "whether the purpose of the search is to 
monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement 
purpose." 145 Thus the distinction recognized by the Howard court, 
focusing on whether Howard was in compliance with the conditions of 
139 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Motley v. 
Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining, in a § 1983 suit brought by a tenant, that 
officers were required to have probable cause to believe that a parolee resided at a particular place 
before conducting a search). Motley, the plaintiff, was the parolee's girlfriend, not the parolee 
himself. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1075. 
140 See Motley, 432 F.3d at 1080. 
141 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143-44 (1978). 
142 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268; see also infra notes 183-198 and accompanying text. 
143 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001). 
144 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 117); 
see, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (holding that warrantless searches are reasonable within the 
Fourth Amendment when a legitimate governmental interest outweighs an individual's expectation 
of privacy); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006) (expanding the holding in Knights, 
which is directed at special needs searches, by concluding that suspicionJess searches are reasonable 
within the Fourth Amendment). 
145 Knights, 534 U.S. at 116 (quoting People v. Woods, 981 P.2d 1019, 1027,21 Cal. 4th 668, 
681 (Cal. 1999». In Knights, the Supreme Court concluded that the Supreme Court of California's 
rejection of the distinction between "investigative" and "probationary" searches was constitutional. 
See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. 
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his supervised release, is superfluous. 146 
The Howard court analyzed Aquino's search as one focused on 
whether Howard was complying with conditions of his supervised 
release, rather than a broader search to determine if Howard was 
engaging in criminal activity.147 However, there were reports that 
Howard was a leader of the West Coast Bloods and was engaged in the 
sale of firearms. 148 A limitation on the scope of probation searches 
hinders the ability of law enforcement to further governmental interests 
of thwarting crime and protecting society from criminal activity.149 
Furthermore, the Howard court erred in basing its determination on 
the propriety of a probation search to find that the officers lacked 
probable cause to believe Howard was violating the conditions of his 
release by residing at the West Bonanza apartment. ISO Rather, the court 
should have determined the need for an investigative search. 
Additionally, the court should have determined the reasonableness of the 
search by balancing Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as a 
probationer with the legitimate governmental interest of ensuring that 
Howard was not engaged in criminal activity. lSI Therefore, the court 
used the incorrect standard to determine the constitutionality of Aquino's 
search of the West Bonanza apartment. 
B. RECOGNIZING THAT PAROLEES HAVE A REDUCED EXPECTATION OF 
PRNACY 
The court should have recognized that Howard, due to his status as 
a probationer, had a reduced expectation of privacy.IS2 According to the 
146 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, 1., 
concurring). 
147 See id. at 1262. 
148 [d. at 1260. 
149 See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2200-01 (2006) (citing Cal. Penal Code §§ 
2931, 2933, 3000(b)(l) (West 2000». In Samson, the Supreme Court upheld the California Court of 
Appeal's holding that a suspicionless search of a parolee was valid under California law and 
'''reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not arbitrary, capricious 
or harassing.'" See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196 (citations omitted). The California Court of Appeal 
relied on People v. Reyes, which held that a search pursuant to parole conditions, in the absence of 
particularized suspicion, "does not intrude on any expectation of privacy society is prepared to 
recognize as legitimate." See id.; see also People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451,19 Cal. 4th 743, 754 
(Cal. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 (holding that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee."). The propriety of a 
probationary search (special needs search) is not a relevant inquiry now that officers can engage in 
suspicionless searches of parolees and probationers. See id. 
151 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001). 
152 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268·69 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, 1., 
17
Kersten: Probable Cause for Probationers/Parolees
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
532 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Supreme Court in Knights, "[p]robation, like incarceration, is 'a form of 
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, 
finding, or plea of guilty. ",153 There is no constitutional difference 
between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
when determining whether a search is reasonable. 154 A consequence of 
probation is the understanding that "probationers 'do not enjoy "'the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. ",,,,155 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that "as other punishments for criminal 
convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting probation 
may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some 
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.,,156 
In Howard, the court analyzed whether officers had sufficient 
probable cause to believe that Howard resided at the West Bonanza 
address by comparing the facts in the case with the facts of Dally, 
Harper, Watts, and Conway. 157 Significantly, however, those cases also 
failed to balance the parolees' reduced expectations of privacy with 
legitimate governmental interests. 158 Although it was reasonable for the 
majority to conclude that probable cause was lacking, the 
constitutionality of the precedent relied upon was questionable because 
Howard's reduced expectation of privacy was not taken into account in 
accordance with the requirements previously mandated by the Supreme 
Court. 159 
Howard was on probation for a bank robbery conviction; 160 thus, he 
had a reduced expectation of privacy due to his prior criminal history. 161 
This was reflected in the conditions of Howard's release that permitted 
concurring). 
153 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 438 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) 
(quoting G. KiLLINGER, H. KERPER, & P. CROMWELL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (1976))). 
154 See United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,896 n.l (9th Cir. 1991). 
155 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,874 (1987) (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972»). 
156 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120. The Knights Court found it unnecessary to "address the 
constitutionality of a suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by 
reasonable suspicion." Id. at 120 n.6. However, the Samson Court held that suspicionless searches 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2202 (2006). 
157 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265. 
158 See United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Watts, 
67 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). 
159 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., 
concurring) . 
• 60 /d. at 1258 . 
• 61 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001). 
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warrantless searches of his residence, person, property, and automobile at 
any time. 162 Howard was also prohibited from associating with any 
persons engaged in criminal activity. 163 Aquino began an investigation 
of Howard's compliance with the conditions of his supervised release 
upon receiving anonymous tips that Howard was living with Barner and 
engaging in further criminal activity.l64 Howard argued that the search 
of the West Bonanza apartment, which resulted in the discovery of a 
loaded revolver and a confession, violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
because he had an expectation of privacy at the apartment. 165 However, 
the court did not account for Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as 
a probationer when analyzing whether the search was reasonable, which 
resulted in the erroneous reversal of the district court's finding of 
probable cause. l66 The court recognized Howard's expectation of 
privacy as an ordinary citizen, rather than considering his reduced 
expectation of privacy as a probationer. 167 
C. A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST TO KEEP A GUN OUT OF 
HOWARD'S HANDS 
The court did not recognize the legitimate governmental interest in 
preventing Howard, a convicted felon, from engaging in criminal activity 
when it reversed the district court's holding that probable cause existed 
to believe Howard was residing at the West Bonanza apartment. 168 In 
assessing legitimate governmental interests "it must be remembered that 
'the very assumption of the institution of probation' is that the 
probationer 'is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the 
law. ",169 Furthermore, "[t]he recidivism rate of probationers is 
162 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1258. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1259-60. 
165 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006). 
166 Cf Marc R. Lewis, Comment, Lost In Probation: Contrasting the Treatment of 
Probationary Search Agreements in California and Federal Courts. 51 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1706 
(2004) (stating "[b]ecause a probationer'S consent to search eliminates the probationer's expectation 
of privacy, subsequent searches do not need to be justified by either probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion."). See also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262. 
167 See Edward J. Loya, Jr., Comment, Probationers, Parolees, and the Fourth Amendment: 
Addressing Unanswered Questions. 35 CUMB. L. REv. 101, 106-07 (2005) (stating "analysis of the 
Supreme Court's prelil1'Jnary, albeit somewhat ambiguous, guidelines for evaluating reasonable 
suspicion strongly supports the conclusion that probationer and parolee status should be taken into 
account."). See also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262. 
168 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268. 
169 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868,880 (1987)). 
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significantly higher than the general crime rate" of ordinary citizens. 17o 
The State has a dual concern with a probationer because, although the 
goal of probation is to integrate the probationer back into the community, 
a major concern of integration is that a probationer will be more likely to 
engage in criminal conduct than an average citizen. 171 The State also has 
a legitimate interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law to 
fulfill its duty to society by protecting potential victims of criminal 
conduct. 172 Therefore, the State may justifiably focus law-enforcement 
efforts on probationers in a way that it may not on ordinary citizens. 173 
"Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of 
probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree 
satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private 
interests makes such a standard reasonable." 174 
The information received by Aquino indicated that Howard might 
have been engaging in criminal activity, and there was a legitimate 
governmental interest in preventing such activity.175 Howard was a 
supervised releasee on probation from a bank robbery.176 Further, 
Howard was associating with Barner, a seven-time convicted felon and a 
recovering cocaine addict. 177 Finally, confidential informants told 
170 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Felons on Probation, 1986-89, 1,6 (Feb. 1992) (reporting that 
forty-three percent of 79,000 felons placed on probation in seventeen states were rearrested for a 
felony within three years while still on probation); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, 1991, 3 (Aug. 1995) 
(stating that in 1991, twenty-three percent of state prisoners were probation violators)). 
171 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. 
172 See id. at 120-21 (noting that "probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their 
criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because 
probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and 
possible incarceration .... "). The majority has, in effect, created a safe house where Howard could 
hide his gun so it would not be discovered pursuant to a warrantless probation search. See United 
States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring). This safe house 
was the result of the court's failure to balance Howard's reduced expectation of privacy with 
legitimate governmental interests. See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring). Further, the test created 
in Howard frustrates the ability of law enforcement to proactively protect the community from 
probationers continuing in their criminal activity because officers, due to their lack of legal training, 
are not in a position to study circuit precedent and compare the facts of a current situation to those 
analyzed in prior cases. Cf id. (Noonan, J., concurring). 
173 See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 121; Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2195 (2006) 
(stating that "a State's interests in reducing recidivism, thereby promoting reintegration and positive 
citizenship among probationers and parolees, warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be 
tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. "). 
174 Knights, 534 U.S. at 121. 
175 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1258-62 (9th Cir. 2006). 
176 ld. at 1258. 
m ld. at 1259. 
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Aquino that Howard was among the leaders of the West Coast Bloods, 
that he currently had a fIrearm at the West Bonanza apartment, and that 
he was an arms dealer. 178 Therefore, the State had a legitimate interest in 
determining whether Howard was engaging in criminal activity, 
especially if such criminal activity was to the extent suggested by the 
confidential informants. 
The court failed to account for the legitimate government interest in 
curbing Howard's suspected criminal activity when it reversed the 
magistrate's and the district court's finding of probable cause. 179 The 
court focused on Howard's interactions with Aquino and the 
observations of officers, rather than Howard's criminal conduct. 180 The 
decision in Howard requires the State to shut its eyes to the concern that 
a probationer will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an 
ordinary member of the community; however, the Fourth Amendment 
requires States to take such a concern into account. 181 Accordingly, the 
court's decision is inconsistent with contemporary Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because the court did not account for a legitimate 
governmental interest to prevent further criminal activity.182 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTING PEOPLE, 
NOT PLACES 
The Howard court held that the search of the West Bonanza 
apartment violated Howard's Fourth Amendment right to reasonable 
search and seizure,183 yet this holding is flawed in two distinct ways. 
The court determined that officers did not have probable cause to believe 
178 [d. at 1259-60. 
179 See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
ISO See id. at 1266-68. 
181 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). 
182 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Samson v. California, 126 S. 
Ct. 2193 (2006). The test created in Howard is likely to substantially increase the amount of 
litigation to determine whether probable cause exists to believe a parolee resides at an unreported 
address. Cf United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring) 
(discussing the proper application of the Supreme Court's tests regarding probationary searches, 
investigative searches, and the "significant" diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer). 
Courts will have to resolve questions such as: How much direct observation by the police is 
necessary to find probable cause? Was there sufficient evidence to indicate the probationer was 
residing somewhere besides the reported address? Was corroboration of a confidential informant's 
tips sufficient to indicate the probationer was residing at an unreported address? How much weight 
will be accorded to a probationer's possession of keys for the unreported address? Was a probation 
officer's rate of success in locating the probationer at his reported address sufficient to indicate that 
he was still living there? See id. 
183 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th CiT. 2006). 
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Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment, and that the subsequent 
search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. 184 Furthermore, the 
court concluded that Howard had a reasonable expectation of privacy at 
the West Bonanza apartment and the search was unreasonable. ls5 
However, the court failed to incorporate the Knights balancing approach 
into its analysis of whether the search was reasonable. 186 Therefore, the 
officers could have conducted a reasonable search of the West Bonanza 
apartment pursuant to the conditions of Howard's supervised release. 
Alternatively, the court's opinion is flawed because concluding that 
the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Howard was a resident 
of the West Bonanza apartment implies that Howard did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 187 If Howard did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the West Bonanza apartment, it 
follows that he did not have standing to assert a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rightS. 188 Therefore, the district court properly admitted the 
gun and Howard's confession into evidence at trial. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is 
intended to protect people, not places, yet this protection refers to places 
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 189 Therefore, 
the court's assertion that officers did not have probable cause to believe 
that Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment mistakenly protects 
184 See id. 
185 Jd. 
186 See id. (Noonan, 1., concurring); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 
(2001). 
187 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97 (1990) (holding that status as an overnight guest 
can create an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable). Howard 
could still have an expectation of privacy at the apartment as an overnight guest, yet the court 
analyzed whether officers had probable cause to believe Howard was a resident without accounting 
for his reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 97; see also Howard, 
447 F.3dat 1266-68. 
188 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S. 
128, 143-144 (1978)) (holding that "in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a 
defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, 
and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, 
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society."'). The Carter Court noted that the "statement that 'anyone 
legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality,' was expressly 
repudiated in Rakas v. lllinois. Thus, an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." 
Carter, 525 U.S. at 90 (citations omitted). In Howard's case, he is in a situation where if he claims 
an expectation of privacy at Barner's apartment, he would be subject to reasonable suspicionless 
searches. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006). On the other hand, if Howard 
claims that he does not have an expectation of privacy at the apartment as an overnight guest, he will 
not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
189 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, 1., concurring). 
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the rights of a place, rather than those of a person. 190 The court held that 
Howard's Fourth Amendment privacy rights were violated when officers 
conducted the search of the West Bonanza apartment without sufficient 
probable cause to believe Howard was a resident at the apartment. 191 
However, this holding implicitly asserts that it was the apartment's 
Fourth Amendment rights that were violated by the search, not Howard's 
privacy rights. 192 
If Howard was not a resident of the West Bonanza apartment, he did 
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. 193 
Therefore, Howard lacked standing to assert that his Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy had been violated. l94 Howard's contention that the 
search was unconstitutional essentially protected the Fourth Amendment 
rights of a third person, Barner, which violates the Supreme Court's 
holding in United States v. Rakas, that standing to assert such rights is 
personal to the individual and cannot be vicariously asserted. 195 The 
Howard court's holding protected the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
apartment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, not the 
rights of Howard. 196 Therefore, the Howard court's holding was in error 
on two alternative grounds. It either (1) improperly protected the Fourth 
Amendment rights of a place in violation of the Katz decision,197 or (2) it 
protected Howard's Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy at the apartment, failing to consider that such an 
190 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006). 
191 [d. 
192 [d. at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring). 
193 BlIt see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,96-97 (1990) (holding that overnight guests have 
an expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize"). However, due to Howard's status 
as a probationer, he had a reduced expectation of privacy. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 119 (200 I). Therefore, society does not have an interest in protecting the reduced expectation 
of privacy of a probationer who is an overnight guest when the purpose of his or her stay is not 
shelter in a friend's house, but to secretly engage in continuing criminal activity. See Olson, 495 
U.S. at 96-97. 
194 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); see also United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S. 
128, 143 (\978) (holding that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends 
not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place."). 
195 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134-35 (holding that Fourth Amendment rights are personal to the 
individual and cannot be vicariously asserted). 
196 See generally Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dally, 606 
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). This conclusion would be different if Barner asserted that the search 
violated her Fourth Amendment or her civil rights. If Barner asserted the violation, this case would 
be similar to Motley or Dally. See Motley, 432 F.3d at 1075; Dally, 606 F.2d at 863. 
197 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1269 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.s. 347, 351 (1967). 
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expectation was reduced as a result of his status as a probationer. 198 
V. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Howard, the Ninth Circuit did not use the proper 
standard to determine whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment 
was reasonable. l99 The court failed to balance Howard's reduced 
expectation of privacy with the legitimate governmental interest to 
prevent Howard from engaging in continuing criminal activity.2oo If the 
search was reasonable under this standard, it was constitutional. The 
court's analysis rigidly followed circuit precedent that was not in 
compliance with the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. 
Knights and Samson v. Calijomia.201 
The court further erred in making a distinction between 
probationary searches and investigative searches?02 Legitimate 
governmental interests cannot be furthered if a search is limited to 
ascertaining whether probationers are complying with conditions of their 
release. Additionally, the court's analysis protected the property rights 
of Barner's apartment, not Fourth Amendment privacy rights, in 
violation of the holding in Katz v. United States.203 Alternatively, the 
decision over-emphasized Howard's expectation of privacy in the 
apartment, which was exactly what the conditions imposed on his release 
were intended to prevent. 204 The court should have remanded the case to 
the district court and ordered it to apply the Knights balancing test to 
determine whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment was 
reasonable. 205 
198 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-20 
(2001). 
199 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 75-129 
and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 152-182 and accompanying text. 
201 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan. J., concurring); Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-20; 
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006). 
202 See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text. 
203 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967); see also supra notes 183-198 and 
accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 152-167 and accompanying text. 
205 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-20 (2001). 
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